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TELEGRAM

June 30, 2004

To: No Action Addressee
Action: Unknown
From: AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI (ABU DHABI 2177 - PRIORITY)
TAGS: PREL, ECON
Captions: None
Subject: UAE OPEN TO HELPING IRAQI MINISTRIES, BUT SECURITY CONCERNS PERSIST
Ref: None

C O N F I D E N T I A L ABU DHABI 02177

SIPDIS
CXABU:
ACTION: POL
INFO: DCM P/M ECON RSO AMB

DISSEMINATION: POL
CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: CDA:RAALBRIGHT
DRAFTED: POL:JFMAYBURY
CLEARED: ECON:CMARTIN-CRUMPLER

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PP RUEHC RUCNRAQ RUEHGB
DE RUEHAD #2177 1821150
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P 301150Z JUN 04
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4940
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L ABU DHABI 002177

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/NGA, NEA/RA, AND NEA/ARP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/29/2005
TAGS: [PREL](#) [ECON](#) [IZ](#) [TC](#)
SUBJECT: UAE OPEN TO HELPING IRAQI MINISTRIES, BUT SECURITY CONCERNS PERSIST

Ref: (A) State 134750, (B) Abu Dhabi 1826

Classified by Richard A. Albright, Charge d'Affaires, a.i., reasons 1.5 (b) and (d).

1. (C) Summary: Post briefed Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials on details of USG plans to offer Iraq's ministries development assistance (see ref A), and asked whether the UAE was contemplating similar assistance to Iraq's ministries. The response was generally positive, although our interlocutors doubted that the UAE would consider sending government technical experts to Iraq until the security climate improves. They also admitted that many of their own ministries are short-staffed and would be hard-pressed

to loan personnel to an Iraqi ministry. End Summary.

¶2. (C) Polchief discussed the possibility of development assistance for Iraq's new ministries with a number of MFA contacts and received a relatively positive response. "We will do whatever we can to contribute to Iraq's ministries and the country's reconstruction," Yacub Al-Hosani, Director of International Organizations, said on June 30. "What we need to know are Iraq's priorities so that we can identify which experts to send. We need a roadmap for Iraq."

Security concerns paramount

¶3. (C) Al-Hosani said concerns about the security of Emirati personnel in Iraq remain paramount for his government. The uncertain security climate is the major reason the UAE has offered to host training for Iraqis rather than sending UAE government experts to Baghdad, he added. The UAE (Abu Dhabi police training institute in Al Ain) hosted more than 200 Iraqi criminal police in March and in April this year (ref B).

¶4. (C) The UAE Central Bank has provided substantial assistance to the Iraqi Central Bank, including training for a group of approximately 30 Iraqis on banking supervision and examination techniques in November 2003. The training took place in Abu Dhabi, and the UAE Central Bank Governor has declined previous USG requests to send staff to Iraq because of security concerns. He has noted to Embassy officials that he supports staff exchanges, but none of his staff so far have volunteered to travel to Iraq. The UAE Central Bank continues to advise the Iraqi Central Bank on an ad hoc basis, and working-level bank staff maintain informal contact with their Iraqi counterparts.

Short-staffed UAE ministries

¶5. (C) The UAE would have difficulty sparing their existing staff, which in some ministries is very thin and at times short on experience. Khalid Al-Ghaith, a deputy director in the MFA's GCC Department, said the Foreign Ministry is not even sure yet how it will beef up its own embassy in Baghdad. Al-Hosani acknowledged that this was a problem, particularly during the summer season when many in the ministry take their vacations. Al-Hosani said that it was more likely that the UAEG would consider assistance to Iraq's ministries after the summer, and perhaps even after Ramadan (October/November), which will allow it to assess whether the security situation has improved. "We also want to understand how the Iraqis, the people on the street, perceive other Arabs who come to help with their government. Will they accept us? Our experience so far is that they are welcoming us, but after a few months, there could be new frustrations," he said.

¶6. (U) Baghdad minimize considered.
ALBRIGHT